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 2 
The command Eat your broccoli, long a linchpin of the prudential parenting handbook,2 
carries added symbolic weight among mergers and acquisitions (M&A) lawyers. For them, a 
metaphorical species of broccoli has been dominating the menu of late—one whose intellectual 
consumption is no less compulsory: The tools of modern financial economics. Signs are easy to 
spot. Rapidly proliferating continuing legal education panels and executive education programs, 
first-year associate “boot camps,” and targeted professional journals are all increasingly geared 
towards fomenting greater literacy in modern finance among the practicing bar. Law students, 
too, have taken note: Over ninety percent of my students who plan seriously to practice in the 
M&A field, for example, will take at least one class in corporate finance before graduation.   
The influence finance enjoys in the courtroom is hardly news anymore. In fact, the field’s 
enduring bear hug of M&A practice was all but solicited more than three decades ago with a 
cluster of watershed cases that would collectively usher it in—opening a door that has yet to be 
shut. Many of these opinions—such as Weinberger v. UOP,3 Smith v. Van Gorkom,4 and Revlon 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes5— remain to this day as beacons on the M&A landscape.6 
And yet, notwithstanding its considerable success in reshaping courtroom discourse, finance 
is increasingly greeted with a tinge of apprehension, even among its ardent supporters. While this 
reception no doubt has many drivers, key among them are: 
(1)   The necessarily generalist backgrounds of most legal practitioners and judges; 
(2)   The progressively specialized nature of finance, often manifest in highly technical (and 
seemingly impenetrable) debates about assumptions, methodologies and techniques; and 
(3)   The ever-widening gulf between (1) and (2). 
Perhaps no topic better embodies the mid-life crisis facing courtroom finance than the post-
merger appraisal proceeding, long a sleepy practice area that has come recently to command 
                                                
2 Some, of course, have notoriously dissented from this edict. See Daniela Diaz, “George H.W. Bush still hates 
broccoli,” CNN Online (6/25/2016) (http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/25/politics/george-h-w-bush-broccoli-twitter/ ) 
3 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
4 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
5 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
6 See generally Roberta Romano, “After the Revolution in Corporate Law,” 55 J. LEGAL ED. 342 (2005). 
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center stage in Delaware corporate litigation.7  In many ways, appraisal constitutes a perfect 
storm for jurisprudential ennui: Its authority emanates from statute rather than common law8; the 
text of the statute is (at best) syntactically tormented9; there is not a clear allocation of burdens10; 
claims trading is widespread, even after the record date for the merger11; buyer-specific deal 
“synergies” are excluded, though often difficult to isolate12; experts on both sides invariably 
stake out extreme ends of the valuation spectrum13; and courts are prohibited from implementing 
incentive mechanisms designed to elicit greater moderation.14 And, unlike highly trained (and 
highly remunerated) investment bankers—whose job requires generating a “football field” range 
of discounted cash flow (DCF) valuations—a judge presiding over an appraisal proceeding must 
conjure up a single number at the end of the process.15 The confluence of these factors can leave 
a presiding factfinder at sea, with little guidance, sketchy support, and no assurance that later 
cases are destined to get any easier.16  
Viewed against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Delaware courts and practitioners 
have long foraged for a “broccoli substitute” of sorts – something that channels fair value while 
sidestepping the need to interrogate, decipher, and ultimately reconstitute the messy layers of 
experts’ DCF opinions. And as it happens, a seemingly alluring candidate has persistently 
stepped forward of late: The merger price itself. As the product of arm’s length bargaining, 
forged in the “crucible of objective market reality”17 (the argument goes), the negotiated deal 
price delivers a ready (and convenient) reference point—one that ostensibly obviates the need to 
grapple with tedious financial valuation metrics.  
                                                
7 See Albert Choi & Eric Talley, “Appraising the ‘Merger Price’ Appraisal Rule,” U. Va.  Law & Econ. Research 
Paper No. 2017-01 (2017) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888420); Guhan Subramanian, “Using the Deal Price for 
Determining ‘Fair Value’ in Appraisal Proceedings” (2017) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911880). 
8 DGCL § 262. 
9 See, e.g., Robert Thompson, “Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law,” 84 Geo. L.J. 
1, 30 (1995). 
10 In Re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, CA 8173-VCG (Del. Ch. 2015). 
11 In Re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Civil Action No. 1554-CC (Del. Ch. 2007). 
12 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 n.8. (Del. 1988). 
13 In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 10554-VCG, at 2 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). 
14 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997). 
15 Choi & Talley, supra note 7, at 2. 
16 See, e.g., In Re Ancestry.com, supra note 9, at 1 (“this task is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not 
simply because his training may not provide a background well-suited to the process, but also because of the way 
the statute is constructed”). 
17 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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But as the great American playwright Arthur Miller demonstrated over a half century ago, 
for those who seek a reckoning with objective truth, there are crucibles…and then there are 
Crucibles.18  From which does the merger price emanate? 
As of this writing, the Delaware Supreme Court is considering two significant appeals19 that 
take on this question in two stages: First, in the context of a qualifying arm’s length sale process, 
should the Court of Chancery be required to defer to the deal price? And if so, how does one 
determine whether the sale process in any given case qualifies it for such deference?  
In the interests of full disclosure, I helped author an amicus brief in one of these matters on 
behalf of myself and twenty other professors of law, economics and finance (including a Nobel 
laureate).20  On the one hand, our brief specifically endorses the idea that deal price may well 
reflect fair value, at least in appropriate circumstances.21  Nevertheless, it also argues that: (a) 
current doctrine already gives the Chancery Court adequate discretion to embrace the merger 
price when such circumstances are present; (b) a strong deal price deference requirement is 
functionally equivalent to a judicial repeal of the appraisal statute, improperly bypassing the 
Delaware General Assembly; and (c) merger price deference – if anticipated in advance by 
buyers, can cause them to soften their bidding strategies, undercutting the probative value of deal 
price as a reflection of fair value. In game-theory terms, the merger price is best able to deliver a 
reliable reflection of fair value when—somewhat ironically—courts can credibly threaten to 
eschew it in an ensuing appraisal proceeding (even if they don’t ultimately follow through).  
But regardless of what happens in the cases on appeal, the ongoing kerfuffle over appraisal 
has important implications that deserve our reflection—implications about both the proper scope 
of finance and its relationship to law.  Among most M&A practitioners, modern finance likely 
conjures up the concept of valuation, and specifically DCF analysis: the process by which an 
expert (or a reluctant judge) cobbles together a present discounted valuation of a business entity 
                                                
18 Arthur Miller, The Crucible (1953) (dramatizing the 17th-century Salem witch trials). 
19 Dell Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd. et al., Supreme Court of Delaware (Case No. 565, 
2016); DFC Global v. Muirfield Value Partners et al, Supreme Court of Delaware (Case No. 518, 2016). 
20 See Brief of Law, Economics and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners-
appellees And Affirmance, DFC Global v. Muirfield Value Partners et al, Supreme Court of Delaware (No. 518, 
2016) (Feb. 3, 2017) (http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-holdings---appraisal.pdf). 
21 Id. at 5, 15-16. These circumstances include robust bidding among multiple buyers, supermajority conditions, and 
easily comparable bids.  For a formal theoretical development of this idea, see Choi & Talley, supra note 7. 
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combining forward looking cash flow projections, risk/tax/capital-structure adjusted discount 
rates, and terminal value projections.  (Diving into the details of this process occupies a large 
fraction of my own corporate finance course at Columbia.) The pivotal role of valuation theory is 
self-evident in the M&A litigation context—both inside and outside of appraisal. 
But valuation is only half the story. Another major area of financial economics—and one 
that has received relatively less judicial focus by comparison—concerns auction design. Auction 
theory has been one of the most fertile and interesting areas in economics for decades, with 
significant advances made in the last quarter century. It holds obvious relevance in the M&A 
context too, delivering important insights into (inter alia): how to design bidding protocols that 
maximize revenue and/or efficiency; how to adapt such protocols for different sorts of bidder 
configurations (e.g., private versus common valuations); how best to share information among 
prospective bidders; how to set an optimal reservation price; the effects of ownership toeholds; 
and the extent to which market tests and deal protections can encourage bidder competition. 
At the same time, an acknowledged downside of auction theory is that it, too, has evolved 
into a technical and complicated field—one that can seem inaccessible even to sophisticated 
generalists. That complexity may well have induced Delaware courts to resist engraving auction 
design desiderata into legal doctrine.  In Paramount v. QVC, for example, the Delaware Supreme 
Court specifically recognized the complexity of designing sales processes, noting that even under 
Revlon, courts will not scrutinize directors’ business judgment if the process was, on balance, 
within a range of reasonableness.22 This approach has been reaffirmed many times over, most 
recently in C&J Energy Services,23 which similarly held that “Revlon and its progeny do not set 
out a specific route that a board must follow when fulfilling its fiduciary duties, and an 
independent board is entitled to use its business judgment to decide to enter into a strategic 
transaction that promises great benefit, even when it creates certain risks.”24 Delaware courts 
have likewise rebuffed auction theory when invoked by defendants. In Omnicare v. NCS 
Healthcare,25 the Delaware Supreme Court (in)famously rejected a competitive sales process that 
                                                
22 Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 46 (1993). 
23 C&J Energy Services v. City if Miami Gen. Ees’ & Sanitation Ees’ Ret. Trust, 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
24 Id. at 1053. 
25 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
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appeared—by nearly all objective measures—to be strongly consistent with textbook tenets of 
optimal auction design. 
The jurisprudential stiff-arming of auction theory is perhaps understandable from a broader 
perspective. In many real-world disputes, optimal auction design may simply be a heavier lift 
than DCF analysis.  And thus, a finance-wary court could easily prefer—if confronted with the 
choice—to adjudicate valuation over auction design.  Such a preference might also shed light on 
why the Chancery Court has frequently resisted enjoining a deal on Revlon grounds (thereby 
sidestepping auction theory) if the transaction is also eligible for appraisal or quasi-appraisal 
later on (where valuation takes center stage).26 
But that’s just the point. Suppose (for argument’s sake) that the cases now pending before 
the Delaware Supreme Court culminated in an interpretation of the appraisal statute mandating 
merger price deference—at least for qualifying arm’s length transactions.  While such an 
outcome might no doubt deliver a reprieve to the judiciary as to valuation matters, fact-finders 
would hardly be out of the woods.  Rather, they would now have to navigate a less familiar grove 
in the metaphorical broccoli forest: Auction theory. Indeed, a merger-price deference rule of the 
sort posited above would almost necessarily train judicial attention on assessing whether the 
predicate conditions for a “qualifying” transaction are present in each case.  And that 
determination, in turn, would seemingly require courts to deploy the lens of auction design to 
scrutinize (with possibly unaccustomed vigor) the sales process itself, its timing, bidding rules, 
bidder recruitment protocols, the permissibility of alternative deal / financing structures, 
information disclosure protocols, reserve pricing, post-bidding market checks, deal protection, 
the incentives of target directors and financial advisers, and so forth.  
At a higher level, the merits of embracing the merger price may ultimately boil down to 
singling out one’s judicial weapon of choice from corporate finance’s cruciferous arsenal: 
valuation versus auction design.  Delaware law currently vests substantial discretion over this 
choice with the Chancery Court – discretion that makes considerable sense in the fact-intensive 
milieu of appraisal proceedings.  And it bears noting that the Chancery Court has been anything 
but bashful about utilizing its discretion to embrace the deal price (or even less) when facts 
                                                
26 See, e.g., In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (denying an injunction and 
noting that stockholders’ alleged harm “can be rectified adequately in a later appraisal proceeding”). 
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support doing so.  Indeed, a sizable majority of appraisal valuations issued by the Chancery 
Court the last four years have produced valuations either at or a little below the deal price.27 A 
timely example can be found in Vice Chancellor Slights’ well-reasoned opinion in PetSmart,28 
where the record reflected a robust and well-organized pre-signing auction process, motivated 
competition, numerous bidders of all flavors, and little evidence of market failure29—all factors 
that should weigh heavily in favor of the deal price.30  The petitioner expert’s DCF valuation, in 
contrast, utilized cash flow projects that either (i) reflected impermissible buyer-side synergies, 
or (ii) embodied hockey-stick-shaped cash-flow chimeras designed more to bolster negotiation 
leverage than to divine value. On the basis of the factual record as he determined it, the Vice 
Chancellor’s embrace of the merger price seems both theoretically defensible and empirically 
sound—and, it is an outcome he reached easily under existing doctrine. 
While I remain skeptical of the merits of a merger price deference “rule” for appraisal cases, 
there is still significant room to improve how such cases are tried and adjudicated. For example, 
the now two-decade-old prohibition on the judicial use of incentive devices such as “baseball” 
arbitration to moderate extreme expert opinions perhaps deserves to be reconsidered.31 (Here it 
merits observing that a variation of baseball arbitration still often occurs, whereby the judge 
sequentially selects between the experts’ competing opinions on an item-by-item basis (as to the 
equity risk premium, estimated beta, de-leveraging techniques, discounting stages, perpetuity 
growth rates, applicable tax rates, and so forth.) In addition, the Chancery Court may choose to 
experiment once again with retaining an independent expert to advise and consult in such 
matters, both as to valuation and auction design.  Though reputed to be an unsatisfying 
experiment when previously attempted, the nature of the disputes has changed too.32 Finally, 
                                                
27 These include Huff v. CKx (2013), In Re. Ancestry (2015), Merlin Partners v. Auto Info. (2015), LongPath v. 
Ramtron (2015) (very slightly below deal price), Marion Capital v. BMC (2015); In Re Lender Processing (2016); 
In Re PetSmart (2017); and In Re. SWS Group (2017) (10 percent below deal price). 
28 In Re Appraisal of PetSmart, C.A. No. 10782-VCS (Del. Ch., May 26, 2017). 
29 See Id. at 4, 108. 
30 See Choi & Talley, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
31 In baseball arbitration, the judge pre-commits to selecting the most reasonable side’s account hook-line-and-
sinker, with the intended effect that the parties will moderate their arguments to increase the chance of their side 
being ultimately adopted by the adjudicator. Such processes were invalidated as inconsistent with the court’s duty 
under DGCL § 262 to produce an independent valuation. See Gonsalves, supra note 14. 
32 The changes are many, and include the frequency of litigation, the stakes involved, the sophistication of 
petitioners, the role of appraisal arbitrage, and the prevalence of claims trading. See Michael Greene, M&A Deal 
Price Challenges Spiking in Delaware, Bloomberg News (1/17/2017) (https://www.bna.com/ma-deal-price-
n73014449766/). 
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judges should be mindful of their own staffing decisions: as noted above, an increasing number 
of law graduates (and prospective clerks) now receive serious training in financial economics—
skills that can be helpful in navigating future appraisal cases. Each of these measures (and 
perhaps others) is consistent with the common-sense goal of affording Chancery Court judges 
the flexibility to ascertain fair value in a manner consistent with the facts and circumstances of 
each case.   
After all, if you have to eat broccoli, you best be the one who chooses the recipe. 
 
